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Abstract 
The paper presents the first “real-time” database to the European Parliament (EP) research 
community.  Quantitative research on the European Parliament has until now been associated 
with large start-up costs as an informative dataset about the Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) has not been available.  We offer a drastic reduction of these start-up costs 
through an online resource with updated information about membership of party groups, 
committee assignments and posts in the EP leadership since the first direct elections in 1979 
until the present day.  As a demonstration of the dataset, we conduct a natural experiment on 
the effect of party groups, comparing the voting behaviour of MEPs pre and post party 
switching. 
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The use of advanced statistical methods to analyze US legislative politics has become 
commonplace (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Krehbiel 1998; Clinton and Meirowitz 2003). 
Research on legislative politics in the European Parliament has benefitted from borrowing 
from the US literature (e.g. Bowler and Farrell 1995; Hix et al. 2007).  However, with some 
notable exceptions, much of the research on politics in the European Union is suffering from a 
case study bias (Franchino 2005).  This is partly due to the fact that good datasets for anything 
but roll-call votes are unavailable.  Although the European Parliament provides a lot of 
information about individual members or pieces of legislation, it is not trivial to convert this 
type of information into a clean dataset suitable for statistical analysis.  This means that 
individual researchers have to spend substantive resources just to obtain a dataset.  
Replication datasets are often not made available to the research community.  This has limited 
the progress in our discipline (Gabel et al. 2002).  
To address this problem we present a “real-time” dataset of MEPs positions, party-
group membership, and committee assignments for all MEPs since 1979 until the present day. 
The dataset will be kept updated as long as the EP continues the current practice of making 
information about individual MEPs available online.  The first section of this note presents the 
technology behind this approach to data-collection.  It also describes the database.  The 
second section uses the database in order to address a long-standing question in the literature, 
to what extent do party group affiliation influence voting behaviour.  In other words, where is 
the party (Krehbiel 1993)? 
A “real-time” database 
Calls for transparency and accountability have led the European Parliament to upload 
information about their day-to-day activities on their internet pages.  However, while this 
information offers great details about individual decisions, it is not suitable for statistical 3 
 
investigation.  A common strategy is to hire research assistants to get the information off the 
web and enter it into a spreadsheet for statistical manipulation.  While this approach is 
common, it is both inefficient and prone to mistakes.  The coding exercise is repetitive and 
costly.  As research assistants move on, updating the data-set implies training new people. 
Replication is essential for a cumulative research programme (King 1995).  Access to data is 
essential for replication studies.  Codebooks are often not available.  When they are they are 
often not sufficiently detailed to get a clear idea of how the data was actually coded. 
Furthermore, the codebook is usually written by the researcher, not the research assistant.  It 
is hence not clear whether it is a perfect representation of how the data actually were coded.  
 
A substantive advantage of writing computer scripts to collect and maintain the 
database is that the quality of the scripts can be independently evaluated.  Detected 
weaknesses can easily be corrected by amending and re-running the scripts.  Collecting new 
data in light of identified problems becomes trivial, as does updating the dataset.  The 
advantage of using computer scripts to code data is perhaps greatest when the repetitive 
element of the task at hand is high, and the coding challenge trivial.  This is also where we 
would expect human coders to make most mistakes due to boredom and for scripts to produce 
most accurate results.  The coding of MEPs‟ background information is one such task.  We 
have written computer scripts for the collection and maintenance of a complete database of all 
directly elected members of the European Parliament since 1979.  The database is available at 
http://folk.uio.no/bjornkho/MEP.  The database is password protected.  Guidelines for use of 
the dataset and instructions for how to obtain the password are provided on the webpage.  
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It should be noted that we do not claim to present a new technology to the political 
science community.  This technology is for example used by Jeff Lewis and Keith Poole to 
provide updated roll-call data from the US Congress and House of Representatives 
(http://adric.sscnet.ucla.edu/rollcall/) (Lewis and Poole 2004).  The use of computer scripts to 
extract information from electronic sources is well known to students of international 
conflicts (King and Lowe 2003).  Jackman (forthcoming) presents instructions for how this 
can be done in R, the leading open sources statistical analysis environment.  
 
The European Parliament website is a good repository for data on both the MEPs and 
the activities of the EP.  However, although the information is updated regularly, the data is 
only available on an individual basis.  There is no useful aggregated data for EP researchers to 
download.  It is in order to  provide such data to the EP research community we have written 
a series of Perl scripts.  This is how it works:  
The URLs containing information about individual MEPs have unique identifiers.  For 
example: the biographic data for Georg Jarzembowski can be found at: 
  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder/view.do?language=EN&id=1  
  The id number for Jarzembowski is “1”.  The identifier will in the future be additions of the 
webpage be used to merge the biographical data with data on rapporteurships, votes and 
debates. We use utilities in the standard Perl LWP library to download the web-pages.  The 
scripts then parse out the birth date, country, most recent national party as well as the history 
of party-group, committee and delegation memberships. This process is repeated for all 
MEPs. We then replace all non-ASCII characters.  The script is automatically updated 
weekly.  5 
 
 
The database is set up as event-history data.  As it is straightforward to identify the 
day of joining or leaving a post, there is little ambiguity about when an event is occurring.  
We record both the start and stop dates for each event at the level of individual MEPs.  It is 
straightforward to extract the information related to the different types of offices in the EP, 
e.g. party group, committees or delegations.  The front-end of the database allows the user to 
select search the webpage by data and type of office.   
Let‟s say that a researcher is interested in party groups on the 20
th April 1988.  Until 
now, the researcher would have to look up the data for party group formation after the 1984 
elections and track the changes as reported in the official journal.  Alternatively, the 
researcher could go through all the individual web-pages at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive  for the second EP and code the party 
affiliation as of this date.  Needless to say, this exercise is both time consuming and prone to 
mistakes.  Collecting this information from our database would only take a few seconds.  
After accessing the database, the researcher would have to:  
1)  Enter the password.  
2)   Select the correct date-range (in this case both to and from would be 18 April 
1988). 
3)  Select Party Group in the pop down menu. 
4)  Click ok. 
5)  Save the output as a text file. 
6)  Read it into a statistical software as a semi-colon separated file. 6 
 
Figure 1 is a screenshot of the webpage with the above options indicated. 
  
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
The first 20 lines of the output, with appropriate variable names would look like Table 1 if 
read into Excel as a semi-colon separated file: 
 
[Table 1 About Here].  
 
This section has described the database and presented an example of how the database 
could be useful for researchers interested in the composition of the party groups at a particular 
date.  In the next section, we use the database to investigate one of the key debates in the 
research on the European Parliament, the power of the transnational party groups to influence 
voting decisions. 
 
Power to the Parties? 
There is a long-standing debate in legislative politics of the role of political parties 
(Rohde 1991; McCarty et al. 2001; Cox and McCubbins 1993).  Krebhiel (1993) questions the 
conventional wisdom that parties are powerful just because voting behaviour correlates highly 
with party affiliation.  If representatives join parties of “likeminded” people they will vote 7 
 
similarly to the other members of the party even if the party play virtually no role in deciding 
how representatives vote.  
Research into voting behaviour in the European Parliament has concluded with 
“power to the parties”  (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007).  Party groups have been able to form 
cohesive voting coalitions.  There are larger differences between the expressed policy 
preferences of MEPs from the same party group than can be found in the voting pattern in roll 
call votes.  However, to the extent that  party leaders control the agenda in the EP, they can 
ensure that only issues that separate between members are voted on.  Issues on which the 
parties split are kept off the agenda, or at least not voted on by roll call votes.  In order to 
isolate the party effect from the agenda effect, we utilizing the data on party group 
membership we address the following question:  When an MEP switches party group, does 
her voting behaviour change?  If voting behaviour changes, party group affiliation matter. 
 
Poole (2005: 162-6) suggests a procedure for estimating the effect of party switch. 
First, include a party switcher as a new member.  Second, estimate the spatial model.  
Measure the distance in the position of that member pre and post party switching.  Third, 
repeat for all members that change party group affiliation.  Fourth, repeat the procedure for all 
MEPs whose party group affiliation stayed the same.  Compare the distance in the period for 
those that switched party with those that did not.  This method is rather cumbersome as it 
amounts to estimating one ideal point model for every member.  
 
We chose a slightly less computationally intensive approach.  In line with Poole, we 
enter  each MEPs who change party as different individuals in a roll-call matrix.  We only 8 
 
enter party switcher in each matrix.  This means that we create a separate matrix for each 
MEP that changes party group affiliation.  We depart from Poole when it comes to the MEPs 
that do not change party group.  Instead of creating pseudo-party group changes and calculate 
the difference on an individual basis, we divide the roll-call matrix into three subsets of votes 
and estimates separate models on the subsets. The only common factor is the normalization 
constraint (mean 0 and standard deviation 1) and a directional constraint.  We then calculate 
the difference between  the differences in MEPs location on these three subsets. This 
procedure allow all MEPs to change their position.  In particular, it allows the MEPs that do 
not change party group to change their position twice, while only allowing the MEPs that 
change party to change their position when changing party.  As such it bias the results against 
finding effects of party group change.  We report both the overall mean difference and the 
mean difference between any two of the subsets.  For the MEPs that did change party group 
affiliation, we report the mean difference in location pre and post the change.    
 
There were 42 party group switchers during the 1999-2004 EP. 13 shifted from TDI to 
NI due to the collapse of the TDI in October 2001.  However, as neither the TDI nor NI can 
be considered “real” party groups, we do not estimate the effects of these changes.  The list of 
“real” party switchers is given in table 2. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
There are 29 “real” party switchers. Some other members change party group too late 
for us to have enough votes to get a good estimate of their new position (e.g. Hans-Peter 9 
 
Martin).  Others left soon after the party group change, resulting in too few votes to reliably 
estimate a new position.  We estimate a Bayesian one-dimensional ideal point model with 
normalization constraints for each of the data-sets (Jackman 2006).  The estimation was 
conducted in parallel on a cluster of 32 computers (Nilsen et al. 2007).  We let the model run 
for 500, 000 iterations to ensure convergence, disregarding the first 250,000 and keeping the 
results from each subsequent 250
th iteration.  The results are hence summary statistics from 
1,000 independent draws from the posterior distribution.
1  After ensuring that the 
directionality is the same across the models, the average difference in location and the 
standard deviation around the estimate are calculated for all members that did not change 
party group affiliation.  These differences are then compared to the differences in the location 
for the members that did change for the periods where their affiliation actually shifted.  The 
differences are presented in Figure 2. 
 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
 
MEPs are sorted in descending order according to the amount of difference in their 
estimated mean position over the three models.  It shows that most members that do not 
change party group display fairly little variation in their estimated location over the subsets of 
votes.  However, there are some MEPs who do not change party group, yet display 
considerably variation in their estimated position.  Closer inspection reveals that this group 
consist almost exclusively of members from the British Conservative Party.  It is well known 
                                                           
1 Due to an upgrade of the computer cluster these results were not ready in time for the submission of the paper 
to the conference. We hope to have the results from these runs ready in time for the conference. The results 
reported here are from relatively short runs, only 2000 iterations, discarding the first 1000 as burn in keeping the 
results of every 10
th iteration thereafter. 10 
 
that this party sits rather uneasily amongst the rest of the EPP.  Their new party leader, David 
Cameron, has even promised to take them out of the group.  These MEPs hence have to trade 
off the need to please the party group leaders in order to obtain favours within the EPP, but 
must also ensure that the national party leadership is happy with their behaviour.  The need to 
please one or the other may vary across different periods of the electoral cycle.  This may 
explain the large variation in the estimated position of these members.  A more technical issue 
also explain why there is so much variation in the estimated position of these members.  They 
are extreme on the estimated dimension.  The model is not able to estimate the upper limit of 
their position very well.  We simply do not know how conservative some of the members of 
the British Conservative Party are. 
 
We now turn our attention to the MEPs that did switch party groups.  It is clear that 
most of the party switchers‟ display a substantively larger shift in their position than most 
other MEPs (excluding the extreme members of the British Conservative Party).  It is also 
evident that the size of the change depends on both the size of the party group involved and 
the relative location of the party groups vis-à-vis each other.   
 
Richard Balfe (UK) changed from the PSE to the EPP. His change in policy position is 
only matched by his new fellow countrymen that were already member of the EPP.  The 
second biggest change in policy position as a result of shifting party group is that of Bill 
Newton Dull (UK) who left the EPP 28.11.2000 to join the ELDR.  The change in position 
does not match that of Balfe, but the difference in the position the EPP and the ELDR is also 
smaller than the difference between PSE and EPP.  Ozan Ceyhun (Gr) left the V/ALE to join 11 
 
the PSE on the 23 October 2000.  Gerard Caudron (Fr) left the PSE to join the GUE/NGL in 
1
st July 2002.  Sami Nair (Fr) left the PSE to sit the GUE/NGL.  All of these party switches 
represent a change in the policy position of more than one standard deviation.  These changes 
are substantive.  It is only amongst the extreme outliers we find differences of a similar 
magnitude.  These changes where all instances where at least one of the two largest party 
groups were involved.  This seem to suggest that at least the amongst the bigger party groups, 
voting behaviour is not only due to similar preferences.  There is indeed a party effect.  
 
As we move down the figure, we see that MEPs switching between smaller party-
groups start to dominate.  The smaller parties do not have the capacity to control the voting 
behaviour of their member.  Switching from one such group to another hence has very few 
implications for the voting behaviour of the MEP.   
 
In sum, the investigation of the effect of party switching on behaviour in roll-call votes 
suggest that there is a party effect, in particular for the larger parties.  Most members that left 
the EPP or the PES changed their position substantively.  The changes were smaller for MEPs 
changing between the minor party groups.  While the results is in line with an argument of 
power to the big parties, it would be useful to extend the time period covered in the analysis in 
order to get a bigger picture of the effect of party group switching.  
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Summary 
In this note we present a new database to the European Parliament research 
community.  It offers the researcher instant access to updated information about party group 
membership, committee affiliation, EP leadership and delegations.  The database is searchable 
by data-range, covering the whole history of membership in the European Parliament since 
the first direct elections in 1979.  This means that a researcher interested in the composition of 
the committees or parties at a particular data, can easily download the dataset from our 
webpage.  The format is semi-colon separated, which means that it is easily readable by any 
statistical package.  We hope that this data-base will lower the bar for researchers to conduct 
quantitative research on the European Parliament.  In line with this spirit, we will extent the 
type of data available on the webpage.  
 
As a demonstration of the advantage of using this database, we investigated the effect 
of party switching on voting behaviour in roll call votes.  The database allowed us to easily 
identify who changes and when then change occurred.  Using the already publicly available 
dataset on roll-call votes (Hix et al. 2005) we calculated to what extent changing the party 
group affiliation changed the voting behaviour of MEPs.  Evidence of such party effects 
would strengthen the claim that the party groups structure the voting behaviour of the MEPs.  
We found moderate support for this claim.  Party changes involving large party groups 
normally also imply substantive shifts in the estimated position of the MEP.  Shifts between 
smaller groups involves less of a policy switch.  This would support the claim that it is only 
the larger party groups that controls the voting behaviour of MEPs.  There is however a big 
caveat to this argument.  MEPs from the British Conservative Party changed their position 
more than any of the party switchers during the 5
th Parliament.  This may suggest that it is 13 
 
national parties, not transnational party groups, that dictates voting behaviour.  To investigate 
this claim we need data on national party versus individual level party group switching.  This 
is not currently available from the EP, but we are in the process of including this in our 
database.  This is left for future research. 
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Figure 1 
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Table 1 
ID  Last name  First  Country  Born  Joins  Leaves  Role  Party 
   2  LAFUENTE LOPEZ         Jose 
Maria    
Spain       18.03.1921  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        ED  
 233  PARODI                  Eolo           Italy       21.05.1926  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 433  FANTON                  Andre          France      31.03.1928  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        RDE 
 799  LECANUET                Jean A.F.      France      04.03.1920  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 941  BRAUN-MOSER            Ursula         Germany     25.05.1937  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 945  FONTAINE                Nicole         France      16.01.1942  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 946  MARTIN                  Simone 
M.M.   
France      14.04.1943  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        LDR 
 947  CASTELLINA              Luciana        Italy       09.08.1929  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        CG  
 949  CASSANMAGNAGO 
CERRETTI 
Maria 
Luisa   
Italy       07.04.1929  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 955  EPHREMIDIS              Vassilis       Greece      31.12.1915  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Vice-
Chairman 
CG  
 960  MUSSO                   Francois       France      01.10.1935  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Vice-
Chairman 
RDE 
 961  ESCUDERO                Jose 
Antonio  
Spain       12.10.1936  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        NI  
 969  IODICE                  Antonio        Italy       28.10.1941  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 971  MICHELINI               Alberto        Italy       25.07.1941  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 974  de la MALENE            Christian      France      05.12.1920  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Chairman      RDE 
 975  SABY                    Henri          France      08.08.1933  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Vice-
Chairman 
S   
 976  THAREAU                 Bernard        France      02.09.1936  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        S   
 977  BETTIZA                 Vincenzo      Italy       07.06.1927  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        LDR 
 983  PISONI                  Nino           Italy       05.05.1927  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
 987  ESTGEN                  Nicolas        Luxembourg  28.02.1930  20.04.1988  20.04.1988  Member        PPE 
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Table 2. List of party switchers during the 5
th EP 
ID  Lastname  Firstname  Country  Born  Joins  Leaves  Party 
1175  CAUDRON  Gerard  France  27.02.1945  01.08.1999  26.06.2002  PSE 
1175  CAUDRON  Gerard  France  27.02.1945  26.06.2002  30.06.2002  NI 
1175  CAUDRON  Gerard  France  27.02.1945  01.07.2002  30.04.2004  GUE/NGL 
1194  NORDMANN  Jean-Thomas  France  16.02.1946  03.07.2002  15.12.2002  PPE-DE 
1194  NORDMANN  Jean-Thomas  France  16.02.1946  16.12.2002  05.03.2003  ELDR 
1274  BLAK  Freddy  Denmark  08.03.1945  01.08.1999  18.12.2001  PSE 
1274  BLAK  Freddy  Denmark  08.03.1945  19.12.2001  30.04.2004  GUE/NGL 
1394  NEWTON DUNN  Bill  United Kingdom  03.10.1941  01.08.1999  28.11.2000  PPE-DE 
1394  NEWTON DUNN  Bill  United Kingdom  03.10.1941  29.11.2000  30.04.2004  ELDR 
1428  BALFE  Richard A.  United Kingdom  14.05.1944  01.08.1999  18.12.2001  PSE 
1428  BALFE  Richard A.  United Kingdom  14.05.1944  19.12.2001  05.03.2002  NI 
1428  BALFE  Richard A.  United Kingdom  14.05.1944  06.03.2002  30.04.2004  PPE-DE 
1602  MARTELLI  Claudio  Italy  24.09.1943  01.08.1999  29.08.2000  PSE 
1602  MARTELLI  Claudio  Italy  24.09.1943  30.08.2000  18.12.2001  NI/TDI 
1602  MARTELLI  Claudio  Italy  24.09.1943  19.12.2001  30.04.2004  ELDR 
1919  KRARUP  Ole  Denmark  17.03.1935  01.08.1999  30.06.2002  EDD 
1919  KRARUP  Ole  Denmark  17.03.1935  01.07.2002  30.04.2004  GUE/NGL 
1959  DARY  Michel J.M.  France  20.09.1945  01.08.1999  26.06.2002  PSE 
1959  DARY  Michel J.M.  France  20.09.1945  01.07.2002  30.04.2004  GUE/NGL 
2038  FORMENTINI  Marco  Italy  14.04.1930  01.08.1999  04.10.1999  NI 
2038  FORMENTINI  Marco  Italy  14.04.1930  05.10.1999  30.04.2004  ELDR 
2217  BERTHU  Georges  France  14.05.1950  01.08.1999  30.01.2001  UEN 
2217  BERTHU  Georges  France  14.05.1950  31.01.2001  30.04.2004  NI 
2219  SOUCHET  Dominique F.C.  France  09.07.1946  01.08.1999  30.01.2001  UEN 
2219  SOUCHET  Dominique F.C.  France  09.07.1946  31.01.2001  30.04.2004  NI 
2312  SCARBONCHI  Michel-Ange  France  24.07.1950  05.04.2001  26.06.2002  PSE 
2312  SCARBONCHI  Michel-Ange  France  24.07.1950  01.07.2002  30.04.2004  GUE/NGL 
2337  CEYHUN  Ozan  Germany  10.10.1960  01.08.1999  22.10.2000  Verts/ALE 
2337  CEYHUN  Ozan  Germany  10.10.1960  23.10.2000  30.04.2004  PSE 
4238  MARTIN  Hans-Peter  Austria  11.08.1957  01.08.1999  11.02.2004  PSE 
4238  MARTIN  Hans-Peter  Austria  11.08.1957  12.02.2004  30.04.2004  NI 
4241  VAN HECKE  Johan  Belgium  02.12.1954  01.08.1999  17.09.2002  PPE-DE 
4241  VAN HECKE  Johan  Belgium  02.12.1954  18.09.2002  30.04.2004  ELDR 
4287  NAIR  Sami  France  23.08.1946  01.08.1999  26.06.2002  PSE 
4287  NAIR  Sami  France  23.08.1946  01.07.2002  30.04.2004  GUE/NGL 
4296  SCHRODER  Ilka  Germany  22.01.1978  01.08.1999  27.09.2001  Verts/ALE 
4296  SCHRODER  Ilka  Germany  22.01.1978  28.09.2001  30.04.2004  GUE/NGL 
4357  NOVELLI  Herve  France  06.03.1949  01.08.1999  04.02.2002  PPE-DE 
4357  NOVELLI  Herve  France  06.03.1949  05.02.2002  16.06.2002  ELDR 
4361  ABITBOL  William  France  06.09.1949  01.08.1999  14.03.2001  UEN 
4361  ABITBOL  William  France  06.09.1949  15.03.2001  30.04.2004  EDD 
4362  MONTFORT  Elizabeth  France  29.06.1954  01.08.1999  30.01.2001  UEN 18 
 
4362  MONTFORT  Elizabeth  France  29.06.1954  31.01.2001  01.06.2003  NI 
4362  MONTFORT  Elizabeth  France  29.06.1954  02.06.2003  30.04.2004  PPE-DE 
4365  de LA PERRIERE  Thierry  France  01.01.1953  01.08.1999  30.01.2001  UEN 
4365  de LA PERRIERE  Thierry  France  01.01.1953  31.01.2001  30.04.2004  NI 
4366  KUNTZ  Florence  France  09.06.1969  01.08.1999  14.03.2001  UEN 
4366  KUNTZ  Florence  France  09.06.1969  15.03.2001  30.04.2004  EDD 
4383  COUTEAUX  Paul Marie  France  31.07.1956  01.08.1999  14.03.2001  UEN 
4383  COUTEAUX  Paul Marie  France  31.07.1956  15.03.2001  30.04.2004  EDD 
4438  OKKING  Jens Dyhr  Denmark  18.12.1939  01.08.1999  30.06.2002  EDD 
4438  OKKING  Jens Dyhr  Denmark  18.12.1939  01.07.2002  28.02.2003  GUE/NGL 
4468  BIGLIARDO  Roberto Felice  Italy  28.01.1952  01.08.1999  30.09.2001  TDI 
4468  BIGLIARDO  Roberto Felice  Italy  28.01.1952  01.10.2001  30.04.2004  UEN 
4530  HOLMES  Michael John  United Kingdom  06.06.1938  01.08.1999  01.07.2001  EDD 
4530  HOLMES  Michael John  United Kingdom  06.06.1938  02.07.2001  15.12.2002  NI 
4711  MENNEA  Pietro-Paolo  Italy  28.06.1952  01.08.1999  03.02.2002  ELDR 
4711  MENNEA  Pietro-Paolo  Italy  28.06.1952  04.02.2002  07.07.2003  PPE-DE 
4711  MENNEA  Pietro-Paolo  Italy  28.06.1952  08.07.2003  30.04.2004  NI 
4752  BEYSEN  Ward  Belgium  26.06.1941  01.08.1999  10.02.2003  ELDR 
4752  BEYSEN  Ward  Belgium  26.06.1941  11.02.2003  30.04.2004  NI 
5736  VARAUT  Alexandre  France  18.01.1966  17.12.1999  30.01.2001  UEN 
5736  VARAUT  Alexandre  France  18.01.1966  31.01.2001  30.04.2004  NI 
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